Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Gene Brice, Willis Hall, Joseph R. May, Douglas
Quayle, Thedford Roper, J. Rolfe Tuddenahm and
Gordan Zilles v. Cache Valley Dairy Association :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
N. George Daines; Kevin E. Kane; Daines & Kane; Attorneys for Appellants.
Roger P. Christensen; Jan P. Malmberg; Christensen; Jensen & Powell; R. Brent Stephens; Robert H.
Henderson; Snow; Christensen & Martineau; J. Anthony Eyre; Kipp & Christian; M. David
Eckersely; Houpt; Eckersely & Downes; Attorneys for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Brice v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, No. 890289 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1876

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

TAH
)CCUMENT
Xr U
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

;E SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GENE BRICE, WILLIS HALL,
JOSEPH R. MAY, DOUGLAS QUAYLE,
THEDFORD ROPER, J. ROLFE
TUDDENHAM and GORDON ZILLES,
on behalf of themselves, for
the benefit of Cache Valley
Dairy Association and for all
members and/or Holders
Certificates of Interest in
Cache Valley Dairy Association,

8

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 870301

CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Agricultural Cooperative;
INTERMOUNTAIN MILK PRODUCERS
ASSOCIATION; a Utah Agricultural
Cooperative; VERNON BANKHEAD;
RANDALL BRADSHAW; DON C. NYE;
FRANK P. OLSEN; WILFORD B. MEEK;
LATHAIR PETERSON; RULON KING;
LARRY PITCHER; LYNN MICKEL;
ROBERT HAWORTH; JEFF HYDE; EVAN
SKINNER; ROBERT JACKSON; and
WILLIAM LINDLEY; RANDON WILSON;
JOHN DOES 1-3 0; SAN SOES 1-10,

Priority No. 14b

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY
HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENE BRICE, WILLIS HALL,
JOSEPH R. MAY, DOUGLAS QUAYLE,
THEDFORD ROPER, J. ROLFE
TUDDENHAM and GORDON ZILLES,
on behalf of themselves, for
the benefit of Cache Valley
Dairy Association and for all
members and/or Holders
Certificates of Interest in
Cache Valley Dairy Association,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 870301

CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Agricultural Cooperative;
INTERMOUNTAIN MILK PRODUCERS
ASSOCIATION; a Utah Agricultural
Cooperative; VERNON BANKHEAD;
RANDALL BRADSHAW; DON C. NYE;
FRANK P. OLSEN; WILFORD B. MEEK;
LATHAIR PETERSON; RULON KING;
LARRY PITCHER; LYNN MICKEL;
ROBERT HAWORTH; JEFF HYDE; EVAN
SKINNER; ROBERT JACKSON; and
WILLIAM LINDLEY; RANDON WILSON;
JOHN DOES 1-30; SAN SOES 1-10,

Priority No. 14b

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY
HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Roger P. Christensen
Jan P. Malmberg
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for IMPA
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
R. Brent Stephens
Robert H. Henderson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Randon Wilson
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (8 01) 521-9000
J. Anthony Eyre
KIPP Sc CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Directors
32 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
M. David Eckersley
HOUPT, ECKERSELY & DOWNES
Attorneys for CVDA
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (8 01) 53 2-0453
N. George Dairies
Kevin E. Kane
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . .

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

. . . . . . iii

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT

... 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

17

ARGUMENT

22

.
I.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
THE RESCISSION CLAIM
22
A.
Due to Plaintiff's failure to plead
restitution of the exchanged consideration, their purported claim for
rescission is defective on its face . . 22
B.

The trial court properly ruled that the
remedy of rescission is not available
where it is impossible or impractical
to restore the parties concerned to
the status quo ante
23

C.

Rescission is an equitable remedy which
is not available where it will cause
inequity by harming parties whose positions and circumstances have changed. . 27

D.

The Appellants1 claims for rescission
are barred by their own delay in
bringing suit and in failing to take
reasonably prompt action to contest
the transaction in question . . . . * . 29

E.

The equitable remedy of rescission is
not available where the legal remedy
would be adequate
.31

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS1 REQUEST TO

i

CERTIFY THE PLANTIFFS AS REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE PROPOSED CLASS

33

III. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE COOPERATIVE
MERGER STATUTES (U.C.A. 3-1-80, ET SEQ.)
IS NOT THE ONLY METHOD BY WHICH THE ASSETS
OF A COOPERATIVE MAY BE TRANSFERRED . . . . 36
A.

IV.

In deciding an issue of first
impression, the court should look
not only to the legal issue itself,
but to the equitable and practical
effect of its decision

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PREPARED A MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER IN ACCORDANCE
WITH UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE
52(a)

CONCLUSION

41

48
49

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Alden Auto Parts v. Dolphin Equipment Leasing,
682 F.2d 330, 333 (2nd Cir. 1982)

27

Andrews v. Precision Apparatus, Inc., 271
F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)

30

Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d (Utah
1986)

33

Christensen v. Abbot, 671 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah
1983)

27

Harman v. Masonelan International, Inc., 418
A.2d 1004 (Del. Chanc. 1980)

31

Ionic Petroleum Limited v. Third Finance Corp.,
411 P.2d 492, 495 (Okl. 1966)

32

Lvon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1951)
Mclntvre v. KDI Corporation, 406 F.Supp. 592
(S.D. Ohio 1957)

.

35
22,
24,
25

McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah
1974)

35

Niles v. Builders Service & Supply, Inc., 667
P.2d 770 (Colo.App. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

Peterson v. Hodges. 239 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah
1951)
Toscano v. Social Services, 624 P.2d 1156 (Utah
1981)

22,
24
27

Authorities
Restatement of Restitution, § 64

29

Restatement of Restitution, § 65, "Offer of
Restoration as a Condition of Restitution" . 22,
24

iii

Restatement of Restitution, § 69 and § 142

...

Restatement of Restitution, § 148
C.

27
30

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-1

38

Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-9(1)

39

Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-30

36,
38

D.

Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2 3

35,
48
48

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Respondents

challenge

the

jurisdiction

of

the

court

over this appeal, as the order appealed from was not a final
order.

The basis for this challenge was set forth and fully

briefed in the memorandum previously filed by respondent in this
case,

entitled

Alternative

"Appellee's

Motion

for

Motion

Summary

Claim."

iv

to

Dismiss

Disposition

as

to

or

in

the

Rescission

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

dismissing

the

rescission claim?
a.

Is an allegation of restitution an essential

element in pleading a claim for rescission?
b.

Is the remedy of rescission available where

restitution is impossible or impractical?
c.
inequity

and

Is rescission available where it would cause

harm

to

third

parties

whoses

positions

and

circumstances it changed?
d.

Are Appellants1 claims for rescission barred

by their delays in raising the issues in question?
e«

Is the remedy of rescission available where

the legal remedy of damages would be adequate?
2.

Is the trial court's order, dismissing the Appellants1

claims without prejudice and with leave to amend, a "final order"
from which an appeal may be taken?
3.

Is the trial court's denial of Appellants' request for

class certification a "final order" from which an appeal may be
taken?
4•

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

Appellants' request to certify the Appellants as representatives
of the proposed class?
5.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing

to issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law?
1

STATEMENT OF CASE AND
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
In
Appellants

February

asserting

agricultural

of

1987,

a

complaint

that the only way

cooperatives

may

was

in which

consolidate

filed

by

two or more

their

assets

and

operation is through a statutory merger pursuant to U.C.A. §3-130, et seq. , and, on that basis, challenging the validity of a
consolidation
between

1984

of

four

and

dairy

1986.

The

cooperatives,
complaint

which

sought

took

place

rescission

and

damages in behalf of a purported class (R. 1-2 6).
Respondents, who were defendants in the court below,
responded, taking the legal position that a statutory merger was
but one method of consolidating co-ops, with a transfer of assets
being

another

statutory

proper

merger

method.

Respondents

provisions

had

not

conceded

been

that

followed

the
and

affirmatively asserted that there had not been any intent to do
so (R. 197-223) .
Plaintiffs/Appellants

filed

a

motion

for

partial

summary judgment, asserting no dispute of material facts (R. 52)
and asking for judgment as a matter of law (R. 49) •

Plaintiffs

also requested that they be certified as representatives of a
proposed class, under Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.
8).
Defendants/Respondents
summary judgment
(R. 91) .

filed

countering

motions

for

(R. 177, 224), as well as a motion to dismiss

The parties all filed memoranda in support of their
2

motions and in opposition to the opposing parties' motions (R.
94, 107, 117, 154, 184, 196, 247, 268, 469, 514, 525).

A

consolidated statement of undisputed facts was exchanged between
the parties, resulting in agreement on many material facts (R.
140-153).

Two affidavits were filed by Defendants/Respondents in

support of their motion for partial summary judgment, those being
the affidavits of Lynn Cottrell (R. 166-176, Addendum No. 5) and
Douglas P. Larson (R. 180-183, Addendum No. 6).

Subsequently,

Plaintiffs/Appellants filed affidavits of Lyle Tuddenham (R. 239242) and Gordon Zilles (R. 243-246).

After the filing of those

affidavits, the depositions of those two individuals were taken.
When they were cross-examined at the depositions concerning their
affidavits,

they

admitted

that

substantial

portions

of

the

statements made in the affidavits were not based on personal
knowledge.
form

of

Also, substantial additional portions were in the
conclusions,

rather

than

facts.

Accordingly,

Defendants/Respondents filed a motion to strike such affidavits
with a supporting memorandum (R. 482-513, Addendum No. 8).
The depositions of the other plaintiffs were taken and
are part of the record.

Finally, the affidavits of LaThair

Peterson and Leland Anderson were filed by Defendants/Respondents
(R. 529-547, 548-551; Addendum No. 7 and 4).
A hearing was held before the court on June 8, 1987.
At

that

hearing, counsel

for Plaintiffs/Appellants

took the

position there was a central legal issue to the case, upon which
all of the claims Plaintiffs/Appellants were founded, and there
3

was no

factual dispute concerning that issue

(R. Reporter's

Partial Transcript of Proceedings, pages 1-3; Addendum No. 1) .
That central issue, as represented by counsel, was whether Utah
Code Ann. §3-1-30, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1965), (an
agriculture cooperative merger statute), set forth the only way
in which

the

assets

consolidated.

of two

or more

cooperatives' could be

In that regard, counsel stated ". . . but the

central issue of this case, once you decide that issue, if we
lose, your Honor, we have to go home. We're through.
other

issues

fall"

(R.

Reporter's

Partial

All of the

Transcript

of

Proceedings, page 3, lines 3-5; Addendum No. 1).
On June 29, 1987, the trial court issued a memorandum
decision, ruling on the pending motions (R. 552-554) . The court,
subsequently,

executed

an

order

pursuant

to

its

memorandum

decision signed on July 23, 1987 (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3).
By its order, the court denied Plaintiffs' request for class
certification and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for rescission.
The court also observed that since the Plaintiffs had made no
individual claims, that its rulings on class certification and
rescission required dismissal of the claims of the complaint as
they were pled.

However, the trial court also took care to point

out that its ruling was without prejudice to any claims which the
Plaintiffs themselves, individually, may have for damages.

It

made it clear that its ruling would not preclude such claims and
expressly granted leave to Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
include them (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3).
4

Also, the court issued its opinion with respect to the
"central issue" of the case, finding that a statutory merger
under Utah Code Ann. §3-1-30 (1953, as amended) was not the only
way of consolidating the assets of cooperatives, but that a
transfer of assets was also an acceptable method (R. 552-554).
The court specifically made no ruling as to whether the
transfer

of

specifically

assets
reserved

from

CVDA

to

IMPA

was

wrongful

and

such factual determination, as well as

related factual determinations, for future proceedings after the
anticipated amendment of the Plaintiffs1 complaint (R. 586-589;
Addendum No. 3) .
Even though they had been granted leave to do so,
Plaintiffs elected not to amend their complaint and proceed with
their own claims, but to pursue this appeal (R. 591-592).

PREFACE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement is written as of the time of
the trial court's ruling of June 29, 1987, and is based on the
facts

in the record

at the time.

Because of yet another

consolidation of cooperatives, subsequent to the one in question,
an even greater co-mingling of assets, liabilities and operations
has occurred.

However, because that consolidation was approved

only a week before the trial court's ruling, the details of such
co-mingling are not in the record in this case.

5

FACTS
This case involves several agricultural cooperatives
which

are

or

were

involved

in

the

dairy

business.

Such

cooperatives exist for the purposes of assembling, processing and
marketing milk and milk products. The membership of each is made
up entirely of active producers of milk.

When a member ceases to

be an active milk producer, his eligibility for membership ends
(R. 141, 167; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
The proceeds from the sale of milk products, after
deduction of expenses, are, for the most part, paid back to the
members of the cooperatives. A common way for the cooperative to
raise working capital is to retain part of the proceeds realized
from the sale of dairy products.

This creates equity interests

for the members of the cooperative based upon each member's share
of the capital contribution, commonly referred to as "producer
equities" (R. 141-142, 167-168; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
When

a

individual's

membership

ceases, the

former

member ceases to actively participate in the cooperative, but
retains an equity interest.

Generally speaking, if revenues are

sufficient, the cooperative attempts to make payments to retire
the former member's equity interest.

Such payments are made over

a period of years while new amounts are retained from current
revenues to replenish working capital.
referred to as "rotating equities".
for such rotation is not uncommon.

This process is generally

An eight to ten year cycle
Payment, of course, is

contigent each year upon economic factors, and the former member
6

has no guarantee that his equity

interest will ever be fully

retired (R. 142, 168; Addendum No, 9 and 5 ) .
Cache

Valley

Dairy

Association

number of years, an agricultural

("CVDA") was

for

a

cooperative made up of milk

producers (R. 141; Addendum No. 9 ) .
During a several year period prior to 1984, various
discussions
separate

and

negotiations

dairy-oriented

took place among CVDA and three

agricultural

cooperatives;

namely,

Western General Dairies, Inc., Star Valley Cheese Cooperative,
and

Lake

Mead

Cooperative

Association.

The

discussions

and

negotiations concerned the joining of the assets and resources of
such cooperatives to work together in one larger cooperative for
assembling, processing and marketing milk and milk products.

As

part of such discussions, the potential benefits which might be
realized by CVDA were considered.
a)

Among them were the following:

CVDA would gain immediate access to a Grade A

market, which it did not have at that time.

This would enable

the members of CVDA, who desired to do so, to become Grade A milk
producers and receive higher prices for their milk.
b)

The cheese plants owned by CVDA, would would

have a captive source for a greater volume of milk, potentially
allowing such plants to operate at greater efficiency.
c)
relating
larger

to

CVDA would also realize the other benefits

"economies of scale" due to its membership

organization

with

greater

markets, and common management.

7

bargaining

power,

in a

broader

d)
CVDA would

enjoy

By unifying with several of its competitors,
the benefit

of

reduced

competition

for the

procurement of raw milk supplies (R. 143-144, 168-170; Addendum
No. 9 and 5 ) .
e)

CVDA's liabilities and debts would be assumed

by the larger organization

(R. 143-144, 168-170; Addendum No. 9

and 5 ) .
In

return,

the

new

organization

would

realize

the

benefit of CVDA's assets, including its supply of milk, cheese
plants,

and

its

cutting

and wrapping

facility

(R.

144, 17 0;

Addendum No. 9 and 5 ) .
The negotiations among the four aforesaid cooperatives
resulted in an agreement which was formalized in June of 1984 by
a Letter of Intent among the four cooperatives, which went into
effect on August 1, 1984 (R. 170, 53 0, 53 6-542; Addendum No. 9, 5
and

7) .

Such

agreement,

as well

as

subsequent

agreements,

eventually led to the transfer of assets and liabilities, over a
period of time, by the four cooperatives to Intermountain Milk
Producers Association, ("IMPA"), the new larger cooperative.

The

transition process concluded on August 1, 1986 (R. 144, 170, 529547; Addendum No. 9, 5 and 7 ) .
During this period of time, there were several meetings
of

CVDAfs

considered.

board

of directors where the Letter

of Intent was

The Letter was consistently approved by the board

with no more than 5 of the 21 member board ever voting against it
(R. 144, 180-182, 529-547; Addendum No. 9, 5 and 7 ) .
8

The transfer

of

assets was also presented

Members of CVDA for approval.

to the

On December 16, 1985, a special

meeting of members of CVDA was held at which a vote of the
members was taken.

The members also approved and authorized the

transfer (R. 429-547; Addendum No. 7).
Former members, including

those

still holding some

equity interest in the four co-ops, were not included in the vote
(R. 145, 182; Addendum No. 9 and 6).
As
exchanges

a

of

result
these

of the negotiations
cooperatives,

all

and bargained-for
four

cooperatives

transferred their assets to IMPA, which was completed August 1,
1986.

IMPA thereafter assumed all liabilities of the four

cooperatives.

Producers Membership Agreements were also assigned

to IMPA and the producer equities then standing on the books of
CVDA and the others were assumed by IMPA (R. 145, 170; Addendum
No. 9 and 5).
Numerous metamorphosis have occurred as a result of the
joinder of these four cooperatives.

On or about March 28, 198 6,

IMPA caused certain producer equities standing in the name of
former members of CVDA to be redeemed in the amount of $1,173,989
and paid to equity holders. This payment reduced the outstanding
equities of CVDA from ten years to eight years in order to be on
the same equity rotation as other producers assigned to IMPA

(R.

145-146, 170-171; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
The principal borrowing of CVDA from Sacramento Bank
for Cooperatives has been consolidated into an $18,000,000 line
9

of credit from the Sacramento Bank for Cooperatives to IMPA and
former CVDA, as well as the assets of the other cooperatives,
have been pledged by IMPA as security for such loans (R. 146,
171; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
Since

August

1,

1984, the

four

cooperatives

have

blended their bottom lines to offset losses from one company with
gains

from

another.

Consolidated

financial

statements were

prepared and joint tax returns filed for the fiscal years ending
July 31, 1985 and 1986.
paid

by

IMPA

on behalf

Legal and auditing expenses have been
of

CVDA

and

the others, including

substantial legal costs to defend a case filed by Cheryl Vause
against CVDA (R. 146, 171, 530-531; Addendum No. 9, 5 and 7).
Approximately 82 former members of CVDA have converted
from Grade B to Grade A status and have received payment for milk
based upon Grade A pricing.

They also were allocated IMPA base

or quota which represents their proportionate share of the Grade
A milk market.

These producers did not have access to a Grade A

market but were able to convert from Grade B to Grade A due to
the established market for Grade A products which was provided
through IMPA.

This has had the effect of producing more revenue

for those 82 producers.

It has also diminished the revenue for

other Grade A producers of IMPA through the adjustments of the
Federal Milk Marketing Order blend price, as a result of a
reduction

in market utilization percentage.

Producers which

converted

from Grade B to Grade A were required to expend

considerable funds to upgrade their facilities, which could not
10

be recouped
available

to

if the Grade A market

of IMPA were no longer

these Grade A producers

(R. 146-147, 171-172?

Addendum No, 9 and 5).
The producer payroll and all of its components, to
include

quality

program,

cheese

yield

formula, milk

market

settlement and others, are all centrally computed and paid by
IMPA.

It would not be feasible to separate the former CVDA

producers from IMPA for purposes of producer payroll due to the
difficulty in obtaining funds from producers which would have
been overpaid (R. 147, 172; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
The amount of milk production in IMPA's operating area
has been

reduced

through

through other causes.

the dairy termination program and

This reduction has an effect on every

cheese or surplus milk plant in terms of operating efficiency.
Therefore, the milk available for processing in the former Cache
Valley plants at Amalga and Beaver has been greatly diminished so
that as of early 1987 it was estimated that the Amalga plant
could run at only 25-3 0 percent efficiency even with the Beaver
plant closed.

The Amalga plant cannot be operated profitably at

this level of efficiency.

The overhead of the closed Beaver

plant would also have to be covered.

These losses would have to

be born by producers (R. 147-148, 172-173; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
All of the milk produced by producer members of Cache
Valley

has

been

collected

and

approximately August 1, 1984.

transported

by

IMPA

since

Farm pick-up routes have been

adjusted to achieve economies and equipment has been modified,
11

reassigned, salvaged or sold (R. 148, 173; Addendum No. 9 and 5 ) .
Field men have been reassigned since August 1, 1984,
and have been reduced from 11 to 8 in number during that time.
(R. 148, 173; Addendum No. 9 and 5 ) .
Over the period of time since August 1, 1984, insurance
has been centrally purchased by IMPA for all fleet, liability,
casualty, property and workmen's compensation and old policies
have been cancelled.
resulted

The fleet insurance provided through IMPA

in substantial

savings with respect to the fleet of

vehicles formerly owned by CVDA (R. 148, 173, Addendum No. 9 and
5).
Substantial capital purchases and leases have been made
to provide for increases to the truck fleet, plant equipment,
other plant improvements and computer capability, all in the name
of IMPA.
milk

This also includes the construction of a $10 million

plant

in

Salt

arranged by IMPA.

Lake

County, the

financing

of which

was

This plant was constructed to process a volume

of milk produced by those producers assigned to IMPA, including
CVDA (R. 148-149, 173; Addendum No. 9 and 5 ) .
Computers

have

been

reprogrammed

and

expanded

to

accommodate the expanded business created by the assignment of
assets to IMPA and the assumption of liabilities by IMPA (R. 149,
173; Addendum No. 9 and 5 ) .
Since August 1, 1984, when the Letter of Intent became
effective, the central office facility of IMPA has been sold and
new quarters have been leased for a period of six (6) years in
12

the name of IMPA to accommodate the increased office needs (R.
149, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
Credit arrangements with customers, discounts, terms of
sale and other matters relating to the sale of products have been
negotiated in the name of IMPA and volume considerations have
been made based on the increased sales volume of IMPA (R. 149,
174; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
All employee payroll and records relating to employment
have been transferred to IMPA and are administered centrally by
IMPA and its computer.
capacity

The availability of the greater computer

of IMPA has obviated the necessity

of replacing a

computer at CVDA (R. 149, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
The profit sharing plan of CVDA has been terminated and
all proceeds have been paid out.

Beginning August 1, 1986, the

former CVDA employees were extended a pension plan under the
sponsorship of IMPA.

No pension or profit sharing plan now

exists for CVDA (R. 149, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
Since August 1, 1984, significant changes have occurred
in management personnel.

Personnel have been transferred from

CVDA to IMPA and many employees have been terminated with some
hired in their place (R. 149-150, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
The corporate entities of the four cooperatives which
formed IMPA possess no members, no assets, no liabilities, or any
purpose for existing.

These corporations are in varying stages

of being dissolved (R. 150, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
Due to the excess plant capacity available in the IMPA
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system after transfer of all assets to IMPA, certain plants have
been, or are in the process of being, closed or modified, which
include the Cedar City plant, the Murray plant, the Ogden plant,
and the Idaho Falls plant.
capability

of

available

milk

available.

the

This has substantially reduced the

remaining

if the

plants

former

to

process

Cache Valley

and

handle

plants were not

With the closure of the Ogden cheese plant, there is

no Utah cheese plant capability left in IMPA without the former
Cache Valley plant.

Equipment has been removed from plants and

sold off or placed in other plants at considerable expense (R.
150, 175; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
The cheese cutting and wrapping operations formerly
owned by CVDA have been utilized to handle cheese production not
only from plants formerly associated with Cache Valley but from
cheese available to IMPA from other sources.

The reliance upon

cheese cutting and wrapping capability is extremely important to
IMPA and its future business (R. 150, 175; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
IMPA has committed a full supply of raw milk to certain
customers and substantial supply to other customers.
committed
efficiency.

to

operate

its

remaining

plants

at

It also has
acceptable

These commitments were made in reliance upon the

availability of producer milk to IMPA from all of the members
assigned to it, including CVDA.

A withdrawal of a substantial

amount of milk would have a tremendous effect on the ability of
IMPA to furnish raw milk to handlers, to operate its plants at a
satisfactory level and to provide a supply balancing function for
14

the market (R. 150-151, 175; Addendum No. 9 and 5).
Not

only

has

the

charaterization

of

these

four

cooperatives changed, but IMPA has also now merged with the dairy
cooperative, Mountain Empire Dairymen's Association
Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. (WDCI).

(MEDA) and

IMPA is to operate a

Twin Falls cheese plant for MEDA, whereby MEDA and WDCI are to
haul milk to IMPA.
continued

successful

IMPA relies on these arrangments for its
operations

(R.

151,

175-176, 549-550;

Addendum No. 9, 5 and 4).
The merger of MEDA, WDCI and IMPA was performed in
accordance with the Agricultural Co-operative Associations Merger
statute, Utah Code Ann. §3-1-30 (1953, as amended).

On June 19,

1987, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and on June 22, 1987 in Denver,
Colorado members

of IMPA and MEDA gathered to vote on the

proposed merger of IMPA with MEDA (R. 549; Addendum No. 4).
Because by that point in time the suit was pending
challenging a transfer of assets, rather than a statutory merger
as a means to consolidate cooperatives, to avoid any future
dispute, notice was given to all members, as well as non-member
equity holders of IMPA of the proposed merger and all members and
non-member

equity holders of $50.00 or more were given the

opportunity to vote (R. 549; Addendum No. 4).
A high percentage of those entitled vote actually cast
votes.

There were a total of 846 votes cast by members and

equity holders of IMPA, with current members voting 52 3 in favor
and 67 against; equity holders 243 in favor and 13 against, with
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a total of 766 voting in favor and 80 against.

This represents a

vote of slightly more than 90 percent in favor and slightly less
than 10 percent in opposition (R. 549; Addendum No. 4 ) .
The 80 negative votes were spread throughout the IMPA
organization.

There

was

not

any

significantly

greater

concentration of negative votes among those who were formerly
members of CVDA than in other areas of the organization (R. 549550; Addendum No. 4 ) .
Among the members of MEDA, 442 total votes were cast,
with 4 02 in favor and 40 against (R. 550; Addendum No. 4 ) .
Plaintiffs,
directors of CVDA.

in this

lawsuit, are disgruntled

former

Each was a director through the time of the

transfer of the assets of CVDA to IMPA.

They are as follows:

J.

Rolfe Tuddenham, age 78 (Deposition of J. Rolfe Tuddenham, pps.
3-4); Willis Hall, age 71 (Deposition of Willis Hall, pps. 3, 67 ) ; Thedford Roper, who has not been formally dismissed, but has
requested Plaintiffs1 counsel to officially remove him as a party
Plaintiff to this action; Douglas Quayle, age 77, who was also
elected to represent CVDA on the IMPA board for two years until
he became

disgruntled

and

resigned

(Deposition

of Douglas R.

Quayle, pps. 4-7) ; Joseph R. May, age 66, who retired from the
dairy business in October 1986 (Deposition of Joseph R. May, pps.
6-9) ; Gene Brice, age 49, who is now a member, and founder of
Magic Valley Milk Producers, a cooperative
milk with IMPA.

in competition for

When his contract with IMPA expired, he became

president of the board of directors of Magic Valley (Deposition
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of Gene Brice, pps. 3, 4-10); Gordon Zilles, age 31, who was the
secretary, of CVDA at the time of the transfer of assets. In June
of 1984 his operation converted to Grade A (Deposition of Gordon
Zilles, pps. 5, 8-9, 11-12).
Defendant Randon Wilson is an attorney who allegedly
provided negligent legal advice concerning the consolidation.
The remaining individual defendants are the former officers and
directors of CVDA, (who held such positions at the time of the
transfer of assets) , who were unwilling to join with Plaintiffs
in this lawsuit, which was filed February 13, 1987 (R. 2-3).
As members of the board, Plaintiffs were, for the most
part, present at the several meetings considering the transfer of
assets.

The Letter of Intent for the transfer was approved by

the board of directors at each meeting with no more than five of
the 21 member board voting against it.

Plaintiffs Gene Brice

Thedford Roper and Gordon Zilles voted consistently in favor of
the Letter of Intent.

It was not until February of 1987, six

months after the transfer of assets was completed, two and onehalf years after the Letter of Intent was executed, that IMPA
became aware that the Plaintiffs1 intended to legally contest the
transaction (R. 144-145, 181-182; Addendum No. 9 and 6).

SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
A careful review of the decision and order of the trial
court reveals that the issues presented on appeal are narrower
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than Appellant claims them to be.
simple and straight forward.

The trial court's ruling was

First, the trial court ruled that

the Plaintiffs were not entitled to rescission.

Second, the

court denied the Plaintiff's request that they be designated as
representatives of a class.

Becuase the amended complaint did

not assert individual damage claims, the court's decision on the
class and recission issues, required dismissal of the amended
complaint.

However, the trial court expressly ruled that its

decision did not preclude the Plaintiffs from pursuing their own
individual damage claims against the Defendants and leave was
granted in the order allowing the complaint to be amended to
asset such claims. Apparently because the court expected such an
amendment, it did, as a guide to defendants in pursuing such
claims, issue its finding that merger, pursuant to state statute,
was not the exclusive method by which the assets of two or more
agricultural

cooperatives

could be consolidated

(R. 586-588;

Addendum No. 3).
Because a citizen has no right to assert the claims of
another, but his rights are only in his own claims, the court's
denial of the Plaintiff's request for class certification did not
deprive them of any right.

On the contrary, it was merely an

exercise of discretion regarding the procedural format of the
case.

Nor were they deprived of the right to seek relief against

Defendants

for

the

alleged

wrongs

committed

as the court's

decision expressly preserved the Plaintiffs' legal right to seek
damages.

Consequently, the court's ruling only precluded the
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Plaintiff's from seeking one of two mutually exclusive remedies,
i.e. rescission.

Therefore, the only real issue on appeal is

whether the trial court acted properly in precluding Plaintiffs
from pursuing the equitable remedy of rescission.
Because the court's ruling on the rescission claims is
the chief issue before the court, it is addressed first.

The

denial of the request for class certification is addressed next.
Finally, because the trial court did render an opinion with
respect to the nonexclusivity of the cooperative merger statute,
that issue is also addressed, as is the question of whether the
trial court was reqired to issue formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Respondents also maintain their contention that the
order in question is not a "final order" and, hence, not an
appealable one.

However, that issue was briefed in a prior

memorandum before this Court, "Appellee's

Motion to Dismiss or

in the Alternative Motion for Summary Disposition of Rescission
Claim."

Consequently, the points raised in that memorandum will

not be repeated here.

(A copy of that memorandum is included in

the Addendum as No. 2).
The Respondents' arguments on the foregoing matters may
be summarized as follows:
1.
rescission.

Restitution is an essential element of a claim for
Because that element is absent from the allegations

of the amended complaint, it is defective on its face.

Also,

because the Appellants/Plaintiffs, by their own admission, are
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neither able nor willing to return the consideration received in
the transaction in question, they are not entitled to rescission,
as a matter of law.

Furthermore, the undisputed facts in the

record establish that hundreds of innocent third parties have
changed their positions in good faith reliance on the validity of
the transaction and would be greatly harmed through rescission.
Because rescission is an equitable remedy, the inequity which
would result to such innocent third parties makes that remedy
unavailable in this case.

A final point, with respect to the

rescission issue, is that the Appellants/Plaintiffs did not first
raise their challenge of the validity of the transaction until
two and one-half years from the date that the initial letter of
intent was signed and six months from the date that the transfer
of

assets

was

fully

completed.

This delay

also precludes

rescission as an available remedy.
Whether a case will be allowed to proceed in a class
action format and whether the Plaintiffs should be designated as
representatives of the proposed class are not matters of right,
but

are

purely

discretionary

Appellant/Plaintiffs,
decisions
proposed

and

class;

conflict

proposed class.

all

the

actively

trial

court.

participated

in

The
the

in the voting, were not even members of the
i.e.

allowed to vote.
clear

who

with

non-member

equityholders

who

were

not

Moreover, the undisputed facts disclosed a

of

interest

between

the

Plaintiffs

and

the

Under such circumstances, the contention that

the court abused its discretion in denying the request for class
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certification is untenable.
Strict compliance with the statutory requirements of
the co-op merger statute, Utah Code Ann. §3-1-30, et seq., is not
the only way in which the assets of two or more agricultural
cooperatives may be consolidated.

Another method is to transfer

the assets of one or more cooperatives into another.

This is

clear both from the 28 year history of agricultural cooperatives
prior to the enactment of the merger statutes in 1965, from the
comments

in the

legislative

record

around

the time of the

enactment of the merger statutes, and from the language of the
statutes themselves.
The express language of Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, allows a trial court rendering rulings pursuant to
motions such as the ones in question, to make such ruling by a
brief written statement of the decision and grounds in lieu of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, by issuing
a memorandum decision setting forth the ruling and the grounds,
coupled with

a corresponding order, the trial court was in

complete compliance with the rules, and formal findings of fact
and conclusions of law were unnecessary.
Because the order in question was without prejudice to
the

Plaintiffs/Appellants1

right

to

seek

relief

through

individual damage claims and because class action descisions are,
inherently

and

under

the

express

language

of

Rule

23,

interlocutory in nature, the order in question is not a "final
order" which is appealable at this stage of the proceedings.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
THE RESCISSION CLAIM,
The trial court's dismissal of the rescission claim was
not only proper, but the trial court would have committed error
if it had not dismissed such claim.
A.

Due to Plaintiff's failure to plead restitution of the

exchanged consideration, their purported claim for rescission is
defective on its face.
For obvious reasons, the courts have always recognized
that restitution is an essential part of rescission.

In other

words, courts have applied the basic rule of fairness that before
a party may get back what it gave up in a transaction, it must
demonstrate its willingness and ability to give back what the
other

parties

gave.

The

Restatement

of

Restitution,

§65,

entitled "Offer of Restoration as a Condition of Restitution"
states as follows:
The right of a person to restitution for a
benefit conferred upon another in a
transaction which is voidable . . .
is
dependent upon his return to the other party
anything which he received as part of the
transaction. . . .
Id. at 255.

See also, Peterson v. Hodges, 239 P.2d 180, 184

(Utah 1951).

If the parties cannot be completely restored to

their pre-transaction positions, the remedy of rescission is
unavailable.

The case of Mclntyre v. KDI Corporation, infra, is
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a

good

example.

There,

a

group

of

shareholders

of

Corporation sought the rescission of a corporate merger.

KDI
The

court held that rescission was unavailable, stating:
The rescinder, however, must be prepared to
meet
"rescission's
own
peculiar
prerequisites" including "ability to restore
the seller to the status quo."
* * *

That the plaintiff in an action under the
federal securities acts for rescission of a
sale of securities pursuant to a merger
agreement must be in a position to return the
defendant to the status quo ante by tender
back of the consideration received is well
established. See, e.g., Parker v. Baltimore
Paint & Chemical Corp., 244 F.Supp. 267
(D.Colo. 1965). Also, see: Meis v. Sanitas
Service Corporation, 511 P.2d 655, 658 (10th
Cir., 1975); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., et
al., 398 F.Supp. 609 (D.Md., 1975); Bowers v.
Columbia General Corporation, 336 F.Supp.
609, 613-615 (D. Del., 1971). Cf. , Goldman
v. Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446
(6th Cir., 1972); Restatement Law of
Restitution, §65; 3 Loss, Securities
Regulation 1793.
Id. , at 597.

Accordingly, it is horn book law that restitution

is an essential element of a claim for rescission.
A

review

of

the

complaint

reveals

that

although

Plaintiffs asked the court to set the transaction aside and
return consideration to them, they made no tender of restitution
themselves.

Lacking this essential element, the rescission claim

of the complaint was clearly defective and properly dismissed.
B.

The trial court properly ruled that the remedy of rescission

is not available where it is impossible or impractical to restore
the parties concerned to the status quo ante.
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As noted above, well-established principles of equity
dictate that a party seeking rescission and restitution must be
in a position to restore any benefit he has received as part of
the transaction.

See Restatement of Restitution §65, p.255.

In Peterson v. Hodges, 239 P. 2d 180 (Utah 1951), the
Utah Supreme Court followed the Rule of §65 when it held that the
plaintiff, who sought to rescind a lease, had a duty to restore
the defendant to the status quo and to indemnify him for his
labor and resources invested in the property.

Id. at 184.

Where restoration to the status quo is impossible or
impracticable, courts have held that the remedies of rescission
and restitution are unavailable.

The case of Mclntyre v. KDI

Corporation, 406 F.Supp. 592 (S.D. Ohio 1957), is illustrative.
There, the plaintiffs were shareholders of KDI Corporation who
sought rescission of a merger agreement under which their stock
was exchanged for the stock of the corporation into which KDI was
merged.

First, the court recognized the basic rule that parties

seeking rescission must be in a position to return the other
parties to the status quo ante.
the

facts

relating

to

the

Id. at 597.

impossibility

It then considered
of

rescission

and

restitution, noting that the plaintiffs, who were only 65 percent
of the KDI shareholders, could not possibly restore 100 percent
of the shares exchanged.

After so noting, it went on to find:

...the futility of proceeding on that basis
in the present case is apparent from the fact
that defendants cannot make a
restoration
to plaintiffs
of
the
consideration given up by them in exchange
for the KDI securities. Verkamp Corporation
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no longer exists, having been merged into
KDI-Verkamp. Thus, defendant plainly cannot
give back Verkamp Corporation stock
* * *

But even this would not substantially restore
plaintiffs to their former position as the
former Verkamp Corporation is bound to KDI by
management contracts which plaintiffs clearly
do not have standing to set aside in this
action; additionally, the KDI-held stock of
KDI's various subsidiaries, apparently
including KDI-Verkamp, and/or the assets of
these subsidiaries, have been pledged to
defendant First National Bank and—allegedly-to other banks as well. (Cites omitted).
Accordingly, we hold the ultimate relief
sought—rescission—is not available.
Id. at 597-598.
The circumstances of the parties in this action are
similar to those of the parties in the Mclntyre case, supra.
Here, the plaintiffs are only seven (now six) former members of
CVDA.

As a result of the sale of assets and assumption of

liabilities their membership and equity interests were exchanged
for membership and equity interests in IMPA.

The affidavit of

Lynn Cottrell points out that as part of this transaction, IMPA
procured $1,173,989 which was paid in advance to CVDA members and
equity holders in order to reduce the term of their equity
rotation (R. 170-171; Addendum No. 5). In addition, IMPA assumed
all of CVDAfs debts and liabilities and accepted the transfer of
all of CVDA's assets, which have been pledged, together with all
other IMPA assets, to the Sacramento Bank for Cooperatives as
security for an $18,000,000 line of credit (R. 171; Addendum No.
5).

It is obvious that rescission of this transaction is
impossible.

Plaintiffs cannot possibly be in a position to cause

all of the former CVDA members to return the $1,173,989 paid to
them as a part of the transaction.

They also cannot force all of

the

give up

former

members

membership.

of

CVDA

to

their

current IMPA

Clearly, the 14 individual defendants in this case,

who are current members of IMPA, are unwilling to do so. Neither
plaintiffs nor IMPA can obtain a release of the collateral which
secures the line of credit with the bank, and even if this were
possible, the plaintiffs cannot purport to be able to assume or
cause

the

bank

to

accept

assumption

by

them

of

the

debt

pertaining to the collateral they seek to recover.
The additional problems which an attempt to rescind the
transaction would have created are too numerous to be practical
to discuss in this brief.

However, it will be apparent to the

Court upon consideration of the factual statement (R. 140-153;
Addendum No. 9), as well as the affidavits of Douglas Larsen (R.
180-183; Addendum No. 6) and Lynn Cottrell (R. 166-176; Addendum
No. 5) , that the possibility of rescission was foreclosed by
irreversible

changes

in

position

made

by

all

the

parties

concerned.
Furthermore,

the

Plaintiffs

were

clearly

not

only

unable to affect restitution, but were also unwilling to do so.
For example, Plaintiff Gordon Zilles testified in his deposition
that he was unwilling to return the consideration which he had
received as a result of the consolidation.
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(Deposition of Gordon

Zilles, pages 282-284).
C.

Rescission is an equitable remedy which is not available

where it will cause inequity by harming parties whose positions
and circumstances have changed.
It

is a well-established

principle

of equity that

requests for rescission and restitution are addressed to the
equity powers of the Court and that such relief is not to be
granted where it will cause inequity.

Alden Auto Parts v.

Dolphin Equipment Leasing, 682 F.2d 330, 333 (2nd Cir. 1982).
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution, in Sections 69 and
142, clearly states that:
The right of a person to restitution from
another because of a benefit received is
terminated or diminished if, after the
receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so
changed that it would be inequitable to
require the other to make full restitution.
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, §69, 142, pp. 284, 567.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the validity of this
principle in the case of Toscano v. Social Services, 624 P. 2d
1156

(Utah 1981), wherein the Court cited the Restatement of

Restitution §142 as authority for the proposition that a change
in circumstances such as would make restitution inequitable, will
prevent restitution.

Id. at 1158.

See also, Christensen v.

Abbot, 671 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1983).
The undisputed facts set forth in the affidavits of
Lynn Cottrell and Douglas Larson establish, without question,
that IMPA, and, more importantly, many other entities and people,
(including hundreds

of other members of IMPA and the other
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cooperatives), have so changed their positions in reliance upon
the transfer of assets that it would be grossly inequitable for
the Court to consider the remedies of rescission and restitution.
IMPA has now been functioning as a cooperative with one
thousand

plus members

for almost 3 years, and Cache Valley

Dairy's assets, which were assigned to IMPA have been upgraded,
improved and fully integrated into a dairy production system
which encompasses the entire Intermountain region.

Plants have

been closed and trucking routes changed in order to increase
efficiency.

All of the assets of IMPA have been pledged as

collateral for $18,000,000.00 of debt. Many individual producers
have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to upgrade their
production facilities to Grade A standards in reliance upon a
market made available to them by the formation of IMPA.

The list

of other substantial changes in position and circumstances is
extensive (R. 146-151, 156, 171-176).
In view of these substantial changes in position and
circumstances, any attempt at rescission and restitution would
not only be impossible to implement, but would result in gross
inequity to hundreds of other people.
would

be

left

without

a

Grade

A

For example, producers

market

investment in their production facilities.

after

substantial

Processing plants of

IMPA and CVDA would be left without a sufficient supply of milk
to run at efficient or profitable levels.

IMPA would face the

prospect of losing its substantial investment in the improvements
made to Cache Valley facilities and be forced to consider the
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tremendous expense of re-opening closed plants.

Such economic

losses would create great economic hardship for the dairy farmers
remaining in IMPA.

In addition, almost $2 million of equity

payments received by hundreds of former members of CVDA would
have to be returned.

Moreover, IMPA's merger with MEDA and WDCI

and the accompanying changes, would cause further inequities.
These are but a few of the many inequities which would result to
hundreds of people who have relied in good faith on what has long
since occurred.
In

accordance

with

the

rule accepted by the Utah

Supreme Court, this court should not consider equitable remedies
which due to changed circumstances will cause widespread inequity
and harm.
D.

The Appellants' claims for rescission are barred by their own

delay in bringing suit and in failing to take reasonably prompt
action to contest the transaction in guestion.
A party who seeks rescission and restitution may be
barred

by

his

own unreasonable

delay.

The Restatement of

Restitution has articulated this principle as follows:
An unreasonable delay in manifesting an
avoidance of a transaction after the
acquisition of knowledge of the facts
terminates the power of rescission for fraud
or mistake, and the consequent right to
restitution, if the interests of the
transferee or of a third person are harmed or
were likely to be harmed by such delaye
Restatement of Restitution §64, p. 248.
In proceedings in equity, a person otherwise
entitled to restitution is barred from
recovery if he has failed to bring or, having
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brought has failed to prosecute, a suit for
so long a time and under such circumstances
that it would be inequitable to permit him
now to prosecute the suit.
Restatement of Restitution §148, p. 589.
The courts have applied
cases

similar

this equitable principle in

to the present case.

In Andrews v.

Precision

Apparatus, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the plaintiff
brought an action to enjoin a corporate merger and to enjoin the
use

of

corporate

corporation.

assets

to

pay

debts

of

the

other

merging

The Court denied the plaintiff the equitable relief

sought based upon a 10-day delay, stating:
Plaintiff made no effort to attack the plan
of consolidation during the period from
February 26, 1963, when notice of meeting of
stockholders was sent out, to March 22, 1963,
when this action was commenced; meanwhile, on
March 12, consolidation documents had been
filed in the proper public offices. By such
filing the consolidation became effective and
rights thereby accrued to third parties. It
would be inequitable to permit plaintiff to
attack the consolidation after he had delayed
until it became effective. Katz v. R. Hoe &
Cg^, 279 App.Div. 766, 104 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st
Dept., 1951).
Id., at 687.
The plaintiffs in this case made no effort to attack
the transfer of assets from CVDA to IMPA during a 2\ year period
from June of 1984, when the initial Letter of Intent was signed,
until February of 1987, 6 months after the transfer of assets was
fully completed (R. 145, 182; Addendum No. 9 and 6 ) . In fact, at
least three of them consistently voted in favor of the transfer
(R. 144, 182; Addendum No. 9 and 6 ) .
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By the time the transfer

was complete, rights had accrued and commitments had been made to
numerous other parties, including the 1,000 plus members of the
co-ops involved, as well as all of the parties with whom IMPA has
contracted to deal.
disgruntled

It would be inequitable to permit six

individuals to attack the transfer at this late

stage.
Harman v. Masonelan International, Inc., 418 A.2d 1004
(Del Chanc. 1980) , is also on point.

There, the Delaware court

of Chancery held that a shareholder who sat idly by for two years
while other investors drastically

changed their positions in

connection with a corporate merger, was barred by laches from
seeking rescission of the merger.

The court concluded:

Accordingly, whether or not it would be
technically possible to undo the results of
the two mergers . . . which occurred over a
two year period, which is extremely doubtful,
. . . , I conclude that the only feasible
relief to which plaintiff would be entitled
is damages . . . .
Id., at 1007.
Similarly, in this case, the plaintiffs sat by for well
over two years without attacking the transfer of assets until
long after it had been completed.

They are likewise barred by

laches.
E.

The equitable remedy of rescission is not available where the

legal remedy of damages would be adequate.
Claims for rescission and restitution fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of equity and because they are controlled
by equitable principles, are remedies which can only be conferred
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by equity.
P.2d

Ionic Petroleum Limited v. Third Finance Corp., 411

492, 495

equity

(Okl. 1966).

jurisdiction

that

It is a fundamental principle of

rescission

or

cancellation

are

not

available remedies, where the complainant has a "plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law . . . ."

Id., at 495.

In Niles v.

Builders Service & Supply, Inc., 667 P.2d 770 (Colo.App. 1983), a
Colorado appellate court stated:
A party seeking rescission must show that
damages would not adequately compensate for
the loss, . . . . Dumas v. Klatt, 132 Colo.
333, 288 P.2d 642 (1955). Furthermore, where
rescission is granted, the parties must be
placed in the status quo before the sale.
Rice v. Hiltv, 38 Colo.App. 338, 559 P.2d 725
(1976).
Id., at 772.
The Appellants herein failed to demonstrate, or even
assert that damages would not adequately compensate them for the
loss allegedly sustained by them.

Accordingly, the trial court

acted properly in preserving their right to seek relief in the
form of damages, rather than rescission.
CONCLUSION OF POINT I.
For one or more of the foregoing reasons, the trial
court acted properly
rescission.

in dismissing the Appellant's claims for

Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the

trial court's ruling in that regard should be sustained.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS1 REQUEST TO CERTIFY
THE PLAINTIFFS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
PROPOSED CLASS,
Puv?v;w:2 claims under t IIP format of -a class action is
'! -

f

consider upsetting

trie

ecisi or •" * '•]•?*•?:-' "-r*"if
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33

class.

For example, Plaintiff, Gene Brice, admitted in his

deposition, that he had participated

in the formation of a

competing cooperative and, in fact, was president elect of that
new organization.

(Deposition of Gene Brice, pps. 6-9). In such

capacity, he would be competing with the people he was purporting
to represent. Also, the Plaintiffs, in their verified complaint,
alleged that the former officers and directors of CVDA had acted
improperly in carrying out the transaction in question (R. 1-25).
(All of

the

individual

Defendants

officers and/or directors of CVDA).

in the case were

former

However, the Plaintiffs

themselves were also former officers and/or directors, and were
serving

in that capacity at the time of the transaction in

question (R. 2) .

As such, they were also potential defendants.

Accordingly, they had an unquestionable conflict of interests.
It is further clear from the record that the class
Plaintiffs are purporting to represent are in agreement with the
transfer of assets to IMPA.

Since CVDA and the other three

cooperatives transferred their assets to IMPA, IMPA has now
formally merged with WDCI and MEDA.

As stated by the Affidavit

of LeLand Anderson, T.R. 548-550, Addendum 4, all non-member
equity holders of IMPA, which included all non-member equity
holders of CVDA, were given the opportunity to vote.

The vote of

the equity and non-equity holders overwhelmingly approved the
merger.
Not only does this subsequent development illustrate
that Plaintiffs are not representative of the purported class,
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certified

INTRODUCTION TO POINT III.
A finding by this court that the trial court acted
properly with respect to the rescission and class action claims
would render the remaining issues raised in this appeal moot.
Accordingly, the balance of the issues need not be reached.
However, because Respondent does not know what issues the Court
will choose to treat in its decision, the additional issues will
be addressed below.
POINT III.
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE COOPERATIVE MERGER STATUTES
(U.C.A. 3*1-3 0, ET SEP.) IS NOT THE ONLY METHOD
BY WHICH THE ASSETS OF A COOPERATIVE MAY BE TRANSFERRED.
At the hearing on the motions in question, counsel for
Appellants made the affirmative representation to the court that
if compliance with merger statutes is not the exclusive method by
which the assets of an agricultural cooperative can be legally
transferred to another cooperative, then his clients1 case failed
as a matter of law and the remaining issues would become moot
(See Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, pages 2 and 3;
Addendum No. 1).
Therefore, the Appellants invited the court to rule on
the exclusivity of the merger statutes, a purely legal issue, and
to dismiss their claims, as a matter of law, if the court
disagreed

with

their

interpretation

of

those

statutes.

Accordingly, even though Appellants now contend that factual
issues precluded the court's ruling, they took the opposite
position below.

Both in their own motion for partial summary
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them did so in the 28 years which transpired between the time
that the state cooperative statutes were enacted and when the
merger provisions were first adopted.
Title 3, Chapter 1, does not state that its provisions
are the only method of merging and does not state that non-use of
its provisions

is actionable.

Title

3, Chapter

1, simply

provides one method of merger that cooperatives can use if they
so choose.
Utah Code Ann. §3-1-1, "Declaration of policy", states
that "it is the declared policy of the state, as one means of
improving the economic position of agriculture, to encourage the
producers of agricultural products into effective associations. .
and to that end this act should be liberally construed."
(emphasis added).

The "declaration of policy" makes two points

important to this case.

First, the act is just "one" means—it

is not the only means—and second, the act "encourages," it does
not require.
The merger provision itself, §3-1-30, states that any
cooperative "may merge with one or more agricultural cooperative
associates.

. .pursuant to a plan of merger approved in the

manner provided by this act. . . .".

§3-1-3 0 does not say a

merger must be in the manner provided by the act, nor does it say
a "merger" is the only method two entities can consolidate, sell
assets, trade assets, or otherwise interact.
The legislative history of the Agricultural Cooperative
Association Act, and that specifically relating to the merger
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broad powers relating to holding and transferring assets.

For

exampl e, in §3-1-9 •• r* the Act states:
'*A,w a S S O ciation formed under this
Act or an association which might
be formed under this Act and which
existed at the time this Act took
effect,
shall have power
and
capacity
to act possessed bynatural persons and may do each and
everything necessary, suitable or
proper for the accomplishment of
any one or more of the purposes, or
the attainment of any one or more
of the objects herein enumerated or
conductive to or expedient for the
interests
or
benefit
of
the
associat ion

Subdivision (II) of this section provides that without
limiting

the

grant

of

authority
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r.nt.,aned

subdivision

(I)

(above),

certain

agricultural
contains

powers were

cooperative,

subparagraphs

worded language.
"sell,

dispose

specifically

this

provided

subdivision

of

for each

the Act

then

(a)-(n), each containing very broadly

Included in that language is the power to
of, pledge, or mortgage

any property,"

(see

subparagraph (f)).
The very broad powers provided in subdivision (I) , as
well as the specifically enumerated powers in subdivision (II) ,
indisputably grant sufficient power to an agricultural co-op to
transfer its assets.
such provisions

This fact is confirmed by the language of

as well as by the numerous transfers which

occurred

in the 28 years preceding enactment of the merger

section.

This fact is also confirmed clearly by the legislative

history, as reflected in the comments of Senator Harwood, when he
presented the merger statutes on the floor of the Senate in 1965.
In that presentation, he expressly stated:
"Evidently there has not been
provided the means for corporations
and
cooperatives--agricultural
cooperatives—-to merge, as such,
one into another without the
tedious procedure of either buying
assets or buying stock or some
other means that sometimes makes it
difficult or even impossible."
(See Transcript of Legislative
History, page 13).
Therefore, the enactment of the merger statutes were
never intended to provide the exclusive means for consolidating
cooperatives, but merely

as

procedure of buying assets."

an alternative

to the

"tedious

It follows, therefore, that if a
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the

consideration which they gave.
position

is

perhaps

most

The inequity of the Plaintiffs1

graphically

demonstrated

by

excepts from the deposition of Plaintiff, Gordon Zilles:
"Q. I'm going to refer you now to Exhibit 7.
Want me to help you find that?
MR. DAINES:
Eyre?
MR. EYRE:

Have you them in order, Mr.

Yes. They're in order.

MR. DAINES: I'd be happy to find them one by
one as we go through this again.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

I have it.

Q.
(Mr. Christensen) The second paragraph
from the top, apparently Mr. Rich in a memo
makes the statement, "As you all know, from
the standpoint of financial statements we are
not in a good position." Do you know whether
that was a truthful statement as of February
13, 1984?
A.

That is correct.

Q. What were the financial concerns at that
time as you recall them?
A. As I recall them at this time, we had
just opened up a new plant, and through that
year we had experienced a great deal of
startup costs, starting up new equipment,
making bad cheese, having to sell bad cheese
at a reduced rate.
All the necessary
concerns that comes from putting a new
facility on the line. As a result, we were
really hurting at that time financially. I
don't know if you would say really hurting,
but we were not showing a* profit that we had
other years.
Q. Was this also something that from your
perception made an arrangement with Western
General somewhat attractive at that period?
A. The thing that made the attraction to go
with, begin some discussion with Western
General, was two things.
One is it gave
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three

j-r jsiUwd..* like myself an opportunity to get
on the A grade market. And the second thing
was that the surplus milk gave us an
opportunity to run it through the Cache
Valley plant. Also, we felt that there was a
possibility of some savings in trucking by
not having to follow each other around,
Q.
So some potential cost efficiencies by
having one company picking up milk in the
same area rather than two companies running
two different sets of truck"
r

That * s correct,

TMa- 's correct

Qe
Luc , ^ i*cw^ an ^ndBrsucinding as to what
the attraction was from Western General's
side?
A.. The attraction as I would understand i\,
and as I had talked to their directors, is
they wanted the cheese plant really bad. the
reason they wanted that cheese plant, is
after we got into the negotiation of this T
found out that they was selling cheese at
three cents a pound below what Cache Valley
Dairy was, which would equal to a regular
farm about 3 0 to 4 0 cents.
So it was very
attractive to them to be able to market. 4 0 to
50 percent of their milk through cheese
through
a better
source."
(Zilles
Deposition, pages 112-114.;
Later

iri Mr.

Zilles1

deposition,

he

testified

follows:
"Q.
Jusi to urient us on time frame, I'm
going to refer you to the November 27, 1985
vote of the board of directors of CacheValley Dairy. That was the one we discussed
earlier. It was a 20 to one vote. You and I
discussed it, concluded it; was probably
really a 19 to one vote,
^ vera Know what
I'm talking about?
Yes.
Q. That was the vote, as understood, it put
the decision on whether Cache Valley, so to
speak, was going to marry Western General?
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as

A,

That's correct.

Q. You expected as you voted on that and it
passed, to go to the membership, that if the
membership passed it that the assets of Cache
Valley Dairy would end up in IMPA?
A.

That's correct.

Q. And you also expected that Cache Valley
Dairy would cease to function?
A.

That is correct.

Q.
And that the members of Cache Valley
Dairy Association would, so to speak, join
the IMPA family?
A.

That is correct.

Q. And that henceforth, the decisions would
be made by the IMPA board of directors and
management?
A.

That is correct.

Q.
And I assume you knew that as part of
that IMPA would set some prices?
A.

That is correct.

Q. I assume you'd been a member of a co-op
long enough to know that some of the
decisions that were made you'd like and some
you wouldn't like?
A.

That is correct.

Q. And as of that point in time it had never
crossed your mind, had it, Mr. Zilles,
whether there was a legal distinction between
a merger, consolidation, or transfer of
assets?
A.
It never crossed my mind.
heard of those others.

Never even

Q.
All you knew was that if this thing
passed, the assets of Cache Valley Dairy were
going to end up by some means in IMPA?
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A.

That i s correct.

Q.
And isn't that, in fact, exactly what
happened?
m a : , s correct.
Q* Your contention is not «tizh the fact that
IMPA now has Cache Valley Dairyfs assets,
it's simply that you understand that the
merger statute wasn't followed?
Is that
true?
A, That is true. And maybe I ought to 5^tay
that if the statute wasn't followed and it
was illegal, I illegally transferred because
I was '*..*? secretary.
Myself and Bill
Lirdlev
Q.
But your i;ole concern is how they got
there , re *: tha - theyf re there?
A. That is correct -"
(Zilles Deposit i-r pages 2^-'?77:)
At

the

conclusion

of

Mr.

Zilles1

deposition,;

summary questions were asked and ^r- testified -ss v^..-. ^
"Q.
(MJk. CHRISTENSEN; /jr. Zilles, isn't it
true that Cache Valley Dairy wanted out of
this, among several tnings, but among those
some of the major ones was an additional
source of milk for their cheese plants and an
access to grade A markets?
MRe DAINES;
I'm going t.- indulge you, and
I'll stipulate that tne answer to that
question is yes*
w«-^
<--t * - have something
new,
THE WITNESS: Ask whatever >ou"ne leading up
to* Everything youfve asked so far I know
I've answered three times,
I can deal
through my lawyer that it's probably r.r.-e
What *s your question? Please ask.
MK
::HRISTENSENj
_ iarz
want you to
tell me what you think your lawyer wants you
T
to say
vrsrt '•"". *r'- -:e: me what is true,
A,

I've

already

answered
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those questions,

some

Mr. Christensen.

Hey, you know, come on.

Q.
You've personally benefitted by going
Grade A, have you not?
A.

That is correct.

Q. Do you have an estimate as to how many
additional dollars you have realized since
going grade A, that you would not have
realized had you not gone grade A?
A.

I have not put a pencil to that, no.

Q.

It would be substantial, would it not?

A.

It would be an amount of money, yes.

Q.

Would it be more than $100,000?

A.

No, it would not be that much.

Q.

Would it be more than $50,000?

A.

Probably less.

Q.

But maybe in the range of $50,000?

A.

Somewhere around that area.

Q.
If you get what you want out of this
lawsuit, as I understand it, Cache Valley
Dairy will end up with the cheese plants
back. Is that true?
A.

That's what we've asked.

Q.
But you're not planning to give your
grade A status back, are you?
A.

Absolutely not.

Q. And Cache Valley Dairy no longer needs
the extra supply of milk from your perception
because there's now milk surplus, is that
true?
A.

There's plenty of milk around you.

Q. So if you get what you want out of this
lawsuit, the net effect is you're going to
keep grade A status and Western General Dairy
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what they bargained for in this deal.
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-:r:-. 3 in
Wcnuerianu, that's probably true.

Alice
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Q.
Do you have reason to believe that the
representatives of these other co-ops didn't
enter into this agreement i^ good faith?
A. No, I do not."
(Zilles Deposition
I'
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POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PREPARED A
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER IN
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE RULE 52(a),
The court issued a memorandum decision on this case
from which the order was prepared.

This procedure is in direct

compliance with Utah Rules of Procedure, Rule 52(a) (Addendum No.
11).

Rule 52(a) requires the Court to only issue a brief

statement of the grounds for its decision and its Order. The
Court is not required to enter specific findings of fact and
conclusions
decision.

of

law

in

addition

to

its

written

memorandum

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a) specifically

states as follows:
The trial court need not enter
findings of fact and conclusions of
law in ruling on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief
written statement on the ground for
its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) ,
and 56 and 59 when a motion is
based on more than one ground,
(emphasis added)
Judge Christoffersen, of the First Judicial District
Court,

specifically

issuing
decision

followed

Rule

52(a)

in this matter, by

the brief written statement of the grounds for his
and

the

Order.

Specific

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law are not required.
Findings

of

fact and

conclusions

of

law are also

unnecessary for the Court's denial of the class certification.

Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule i-

as practi cable ail(
class action, the
be

commencement

c-*- A- r

An
•

Addendum

altered,
merits,
an

a c : u L brought as a

- •

-

(

~ tee r,,c

r-

itself sets ^ r ~ - y

•

.

..». ;•..-!; -r

--..r, amended

...

states that

all
other

anytime before t:;e final decision on the

r *

.—

^„„~

* -* . c

'.lass .is even
-

specifically

,t may ce aiterec or amended b e f o r e final decisi en on

the merits and the lower Court expressly
damages

be

,uo: ;,ay thereafter be

;t is very debatable whether denia*:

gpcea.. ^r. --

ITIH '('

.r amende . before ccc- decision on the

•.

-. "

.' *- ~ '

unde.

tnat is required by *h fi ^-.-y
the c.as-

,. ^

^jurt shaj1 determine by order whether it is to

ma Inta 1 ned .

writs'1

—-* -

•«••-

f )rther

Ciflcusci

tnir=.

* : r,

left ouen th

.,

iS^-^.

-•
see

rtddendun-

NO

-

:-;>.-•
detailed

incorporated

h e r e w i t h by reference) .

CONCLUSION
For
submitted
b€

that

the

reasons

set

the decisior

af:: , v -

~

forth

*r.i ^:- "S~-

i *e;.v:,

v

above,
'

i%

day of M a y , 1 9 8 8 .
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is respect fully

*

. •.

that t:ie appeal

dismissed.
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